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Paul Atkinson*
Ronald Lee and Ryan Edwards have provided a comprehensive
analysis of the prospective budgetary implications of the aging of the U.S.
population over the period to 2100. They cover a lot of ground but two
major points stand out: Their analysis suggests that the budget pressures
that aging will imply will be intense and very possibly greater than many
other analyses would suggest; and the most important pressure is less
likely to come from Social Security payments of old-age pensions than
from demand for medical care. Their most important policy message
relates to the need for policymakers and the wider public to be educated
to the realities aging will imply, in order to facilitate the difﬁcult decisions
that will be needed. I can only endorse this message and note that the
necessary decisions become more difﬁcult as they are delayed.
At the OECD we have endeavored to call attention to the implica-
tions of population aging for many years, at least since 1989.1 I have been
encouraged by the organizers to draw on some of this work to supple-
ment the analysis of Professors Lee and Edwards by providing some
evidence as to how aging will affect other countries. This request is very
timely, as we have just completed a substantial study designed to re-
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areas.ﬂect institutional details of pension systems in member countries better
than previous OECD studies, while maintaining a reasonable degree of
cross-country comparability. The main results, including sensitivity anal-
ysis and a discussion of policy options, have just been released as a
chapter in the June issue of OECD Economic Outlook. I cannot cover it all
in this note, but I would like to do three things: (1) brieﬂy describe the
study; (2) compare the results for the United States with those reported by
Lee and Edwards; and (3) put the results for the United States into an
international perspective.
THE OECD STUDY
The OECD study, which has been carried out in collaboration with
the Working Group on Ageing of the Economic Policy Committee of the
European Union, was a collaborative effort in which the OECD secretariat
coordinated the analysis carried out by national administrations in
member countries and synthesized the results. Countries agreed on a
common set of assumptions affecting demographics (see Box 1) and key
macroeconomic variables (see Box 2). These assumptions were then used
as the starting point for an analysis of age-related expenditures, revenues,
and government deﬁcits, using models of national administrations or
research institutes. Our direct interlocutor in the United States was the
Council of Economic Advisers but the results reported here were pro-
vided by the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB).
The study, like the Lee and Edwards paper, goes beyond old-age
pension programs to cover other expenditure items affected by demo-
graphic change. These include those facilitating early withdrawal from
the labor market, health care and long-term care for the frail elderly,
family/child beneﬁts, and education. Where countries provided informa-
tion on this range of expenditure items they represent between 40 and 60
percent of total general government spending.2 Some points to note:
• The time horizon covered by the OECD study is 2050, somewhat
shorter than that of Lee and Edwards.
• Old-age pension spending includes, in principle, all old-age pensions,
all early retirement pension spending that is an integral part of the
public pensions system, and survivors’ and minimum pensions.
Comparisons with OECD sources3 suggest that the program
coverage in the projections may be understated in several coun-
tries, including the United States, and, hence, for these countries,
the spending projections reported here may be understated.
2 Coverage across countries for old-age pensions is much more complete than for these
other items.
3 Compared with the OECD Social Expenditure Data File (SOCX). See Dang et al. (2001)
for details.
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Assumptions of the OECD Study
Population projections
Projections were based on the middle variant of national or, in the case of
EU countries, Eurostat population projections. The proﬁle of populations
over time in these projections depends on assumptions about fertility,
mortality, and immigration (see Table 1). The Eurostat population projec-
tions were specially prepared for this exercise.
Fertility
In virtually all countries fertility rates are projected to rise from an
average of around 1.5 toward levels ranging between 1.5 and 1.8 by 2050,
with most of the increase occurring over the next two decades. The largest
increases are expected to occur in low-fertility countries such as the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Italy, and Spain, but increases are also substantial in
Belgium and Sweden. Denmark, Finland, and Norway are assumed to have
fairly constant fertility rates. Only Australia, Canada, and the United States
are projected to experience signiﬁcant declines.
Life expectancy
Life expectancy at birth is expected to increase, on average, by almost ﬁve
years for males and four years for females from 2000 to 2050, thus allowing
some catch-up between the two sexes. Gains in life expectancy are similar
across the majority of countries, although they are smaller for men in the
Czech Republic and Japan and higher in Hungary and in Poland, which has
a particularly low level at the beginning of the period. For women, the
increases are smaller in Canada, the Czech Republic, Japan, Norway, and
Spain and signiﬁcantly higher in Australia, Austria, Hungary, Poland, and
the United Kingdom.
Net immigration
Net immigration is difﬁcult to predict since it will depend on countries’
economic situation and policies. Countries with higher levels of immigra-
tion at the beginning of the period tend to project falls (Australia, Canada,
Germany, Norway, and the United States), while a number of countries
with low levels project increases (Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Spain). Once
again, changes tend to be concentrated in the ﬁrst half of the period.
Implications for dependency
These various developments contribute to the ﬂattening in the depen-
dency ratios toward the middle of the century. The replacement of the
baby-boom generation by smaller cohorts leads to slower growth in the
number of elderly. At the same time, the projected increase in fertility
during the ﬁrst few decades, combined with rising immigration (excluding
North America, Germany, and Norway), contributes to a more rapid rise in
the working-age population toward the end of the period.
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Assumptions of the OECD Study
Taking these population projections as the starting point, the proﬁle of
GDP to 2050 was calculated in the following manner:
• Participation rates for the period to 2010 are based on ILO projections
(ILO 1997). For the subsequent period, the participation rates stay
constant for men aged 20 to 54 (prime age) and 55 to 64 (older workers)
as well as for all retirement-age individuals and all persons under the
age of 20. Participation rates for women aged 20 to 54 and 55 to 64
rise progressively toward a ceiling at the end of the period equal to
5 percentage points below those of men in countries with widely
subsidized child care and 10 percentage points below elsewhere. Some
countries deviate marginally from these rules because of the expected
impact of recent policies (for example, higher retirement ages). How-
ever, with the exception of Austria,
a these differences do not appear
large enough to affect the results signiﬁcantly.
• Unemployment rates converge to their structural levels (as deﬁned by
the OECD) in 2005, with unemployment rates held constant at the 2005
rate throughout the period to 2050, except for countries where existing
labor-market reforms presupposed a further decline in structural
unemployment over the period.
b The authorities in Belgium, France,
and Italy built in this decline. The Spanish authorities allowed its
unemployment rate to fall over the period to 4 percent, well outside the
agreed limits.
• Labor productivity growth (measured as GDP per worker) converges
toward an annual rate of 1.75 percent between 2020 and 2030. Some
catch-up is allowed for initially low-productivity countries such as the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Poland, and Portugal. Assumptions
for productivity growth were so high as to seriously compromise cross-
country comparability in Portugal, and this country has been treated
separately in this documentation. Average productivity growth rates
are signiﬁcantly lower in Canada and Norway. GDP was established
by multiplying the number of employed by average productivity.
Where countries have short- to medium-term budget projections up to
2005, the aging projections were run off these. Non-age-related expendi-
tures and government revenues are kept constant as a share of GDP after
this point, except to the degree that there are clearly identiﬁed effects arising
from aging or from background assumptions—for example, reduced
spending on unemployment insurance as unemployment falls, or higher tax
revenues as a result of pensions paid from tax-sheltered savings in pension
funds.
a Instead of broad constancy in the participation rates for older male workers after
2010, the Austrian projections assume that they will rise by 33 percentage points, to
71 percent, by the end of the period. This reﬂects the assumed impact of recent
reforms to early-retirement policies.
b This adjustment was limited to one-third of the structural unemployment levels
in 2005.
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of working age—for example, disability pensions, long-term unem-
ployment beneﬁts and early retirement arrangements for labor
market reasons. These programs can be affected by aging, for
example via larger numbers of older workers with their higher
probabilities of becoming disabled. Such programs have contrib-
uted in many countries to the marked fall in the participation rates
of older male workers over the past several decades. Many
countries have introduced reforms to tighten access to these
programs and to limit beneﬁts.
• Projections of health-care spending (including costs of care for the
frail elderly) for most countries are broadly based on projected per
capita health-care expenditures by age group (which rise with age)
multiplied by the number of people in each age group.4 Non-age-
related factors (such as higher income and technology change)
have been taken into account to varying degrees.
• Spending on child-related programs, that is, education and family/
child beneﬁts, largely depends on youth dependency ratios.
Comparison between Lee-Edwards and
OECD Results for the United States
It will be seen below that although there are similarities between the
OECD results reported here and the Lee-Edwards results, there are also
signiﬁcant differences. To facilitate comparisons I have attempted to
replicate several of the Lee-Edwards ﬁgures using OECD data and
projections as well as the relevant data helpfully provided by Professor
Lee. Since the OECD results reported here were provided by the Ofﬁce of
Management and Budget, while Lee and Edwards have followed the
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce in at least a number of respects, the
differences point to a high degree of sensitivity of the analysis of
age-related spending pressures to differences in assumptions that differ-
ent parts of the U.S. government appear to regard as plausible.
Many of the demographic assumptions underlying the two studies
appear to be fairly similar. The fertility and immigration assumptions are
essentially the same, but mortality assumptions in the OECD study are
more in line with those of the Social Security Administration than the
Lee-Carter projections that underlie the Lee-Edwards results.5 Neverthe-
less, the old-age dependency ratio in the OECD study tracks the U.S.
4 However, the projections for the Netherlands allow for the fact that a large share of
total lifetime health-care costs occur in the last year or two of life.
5 Issues relating to the best way to project mortality along the lines of those discussed
by Lee-Edwards were acknowledged and sensitivity tests show that results vary signiﬁ-
cantly with changes in assumptions made about longevity. The risk that longevity may be
understated was recognized by contributors to the OECD study.
224 Paul AtkinsonCensus Bureau projections fairly closely (Figure 1) and in 2050 they are
only slightly below the Lee-Tuljapurkar median projections used by
Lee-Edwards. Nevertheless, the underlying differences in treatment of
mortality may be enough to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the projections
of beneﬁt costs.
The other difference in underlying assumptions that may inﬂuence
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assumed that labor productivity growth converges across countries to
1.75 percent by 2020 or just afterward. This is around 0.5 percent below
the 2.3 percent used by Lee-Edwards.
Figure 2 provides a comparison of the results of the OECD study for
226 Paul Atkinsonthe United States with those of Lee-Edwards. In important respects the
OECD results are consistent with the Lee-Edwards projections:
• Some time around 2010 federal spending will start rising sharply,
driven by age-related spending on the elderly.
• The major source of pressure will be health care, while old-age
pensions will account for a relatively modest proportion of the
total increase.
At the same time, there are differences:
• While projected spending on old-age pensions in the two studies is
fairly similar, the Lee-Edwards projections for medical spending
are signiﬁcantly higher, by around 2 percent of GDP in 2050, and
rising faster than those the OECD received from OMB.
• The OECD study is more optimistic as regards child-related and
age-neutral spending pressures, though only slightly.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this comparison is the
difference in projected health care spending. Since OMB has not reported
all the underlying details of its analysis to OECD, there are limits to how
well the reasons for this can be identiﬁed. The OECD study includes some
sensitivity analysis that suggests that increased longevity more in line
with the Lee-Edwards approach would add just over 1 percent of GDP to
medical spending and around 2 percent of GDP to total age-related
spending.6 Sensitivity tests for productivity did not yield sensible results
for the United States. However, if pooled results, that is, not based on
results for any single country, could be applied to the United States, they
would suggest that higher productivity in line with that assumed by
Lee-Edwards would slightly, but not signiﬁcantly, reduce the upward
pressure on spending as a share of GDP.
Superﬁcially, these assumptions by themselves do not appear to
account fully for the difference. The obvious conjecture is that details of
the speciﬁcation of medical care costs are at the heart of the matter. In this
regard, however, the different approaches to longevity may be playing a
large role, since these inﬂuence assumptions about health status late in
life and the number of beneﬁciaries at any particular stage. If Lee and
Edwards are correct that most mortality projections, including those used
in the OECD study, are underestimating longevity, they are calling
attention to an important upside risk to future budget pressures.
Given the speculative nature of any long-term projections in this
area, perhaps not too much should be made of the different numerical
6 Speciﬁcally, increased life expectancy of three years for men and two years for women
would add 1.0 percent of GDP to old-age pensions spending, 1.2 percent of GDP to health
and long-term care spending, and 2.1 percent of GDP to total age-related spending in 2050.
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Medicaid beneﬁts rise by a ﬁxed margin over productivity growth is
analytically tractable and may be sensible, but the arithmetic of com-
pound interest has a powerful effect over a 50- to 100-year time horizon.
More optimistic assumptions about our ability to control medical costs
would lead to signiﬁcantly different results. Similarly, work at the OECD
suggests that if current trends toward reduced disability are projected
forward, costs of long-term care for the frail elderly will be substantially
lower. The important message here is the focus it puts on medical and
long-term care costs in the overall aging cost picture, not the precise
numbers.
Projections for the United States Compared to
Twenty-One Other OECD Countries
The main demographic assumptions underlying the OECD study are
reported in Table 1 and the proﬁle of old-age dependency ratios that
Table 1
Assumptions for Fertility, Life Expectancy, and Immigration
Fertility (Children per Woman) Life Expectancy at Birth for Males
2000 2050 2000 2050
Australia 1.72 1.56 Australia 76.7 82.6
Austria 1.31 1.50 Austria 75.0 80.3
Belgium 1.54 1.80 Belgium 75.3 80.5
Canada 1.62 1.50 Canada 75.5 80.0
Czech Republic 1.14 1.50 Czech Republic 71.5 75.2
Denmark 1.77 1.80 Denmark 74.8 79.1
Finland 1.73 1.70 Finland 73.9 79.9
France 1.73 1.80 France 74.8 80.0
Germany 1.40 1.50 Germany 74.7 80.0
Hungary 1.30 1.60 Hungary 66.8 74.6
Italy 1.22 1.50 Italy 75.5 81.0
Japan 1.38 1.61 Japan 77.4 79.4
Korea 1.71 1.59 Korea 70.6 76.2
Netherlands 1.71 1.80 Netherlands 75.5 80.0
New Zealand — — New Zealand
a 74.3 79.5
Norway 1.80 1.80 Norway 75.7 80.0
Poland 1.34 1.58 Poland 69.9 78.5
Portugal 1.53 1.70 Portugal 72.0 78.0
Spain 1.19 1.50 Spain 74.9 79.0
Sweden 1.50 1.80 Sweden 77.3 82.0
United Kingdom 1.72 1.80 United Kingdom 75.2 80.0
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points stand out:
• The fertility rate in the United States is relatively high in an
international context, currently around replacement level and
projected (by the SSA) to decline only slightly in the future. Even
though fertility was assumed to rise in most other countries, it was
assumed to remain well below replacement rate and below the
U.S. level in all countries considered.
• Assumed changes in immigration are probably too small to affect
the analysis signiﬁcantly except perhaps in Australia.
• Life expectancy was assumed to rise by around 4.5 years on
average, below historical trend rates and with signiﬁcant cross-
country variation.
Table 1 (continued)
Assumptions for Fertility, Life Expectancy, and Immigration
Immigration (percent of Total Population) Life Expectancy at Birth for Females
2000 2050 2000 2050
Australia .90 .41 Australia 82.2 87.8
Austria .12 .26 Austria 81.2 86.0
Belgium .10 .15 Belgium 81.4 85.5
Canada .60 .43 Canada 81.3 84.0
Czech Republic .09 .18 Czech Republic 78.4 81.5
Denmark .20 .18 Denmark 79.2 82.8
Finland .11 .10 Finland 81.1 85.0
France .08 .08 France 82.8 87.0
Germany .36 .26 Germany 80.8 85.0
Hungary .09 .04 Hungary 75.2 81.1
Italy .09 .17 Italy 82.0 86.0
Japan —— Japan 84.1 86.5
Korea —— Korea 78.1 83.0
Netherlands .21 .20 Netherlands 80.9 85.0
New Zealand —— New Zealand
a 81.0 85.5
Norway .30 .19 Norway 81.4 84.5
Poland —— Poland 78.2 84.7
Portugal .12 .23 Portugal 79.2 84.0
Spain .08 .17 Spain 82.1 85.0
Sweden .17 .22 Sweden 82.0 86.0
United Kingdom .15 .11 United Kingdom 80.0 85.0







— Indicates unavailable data.
a Data are for 1996 and 2051.
b OECD average is unweighted and excludes countries where information is not available.
Source: OECD.
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proﬁles vary signiﬁcantly across countries over the next ﬁfty years,
with ratios rising faster and generally by larger amounts in most of
continental Europe outside Scandinavia and in Japan than else-
where. Old-age dependency in the United States is projected to rise
more slowly and by less than in almost all other countries
considered here.
The main results are reported in Table 2. The pressures projected to
emerge in the United States are somewhat below average in an interna-
tional context (Panel A). Furthermore, the source of these pressures
differs signiﬁcantly from most other countries in that medical care, rather
230 Paul Atkinsonthan pensions, will be the main factor. Key points to note include the
following:
• Projections based on assumptions of unchanged policy—although
taking into account reforms legislated but not yet implemented—
suggest that old-age pension spending will rise on average across
countries by around 3 to 4 percentage points of GDP in the period
to 2050 (Panel B), but with considerable cross-country variation.
Spending relative to GDP starts to rise quickly in the latter part of
the current decade, but then slows from around 2035–40, with
declines in a few countries.7 The projected increase for the United
States over this period of less than 2 percentage points is modest in
an international context.
• While the coverage varies across countries, “early retirement”
programs8 represent around 1.5 percentage points of GDP in the
countries providing data, although considerably more in Den-
mark, Finland, Norway, and Portugal (Panel C). Despite the in-
creasing average age of the working population over the period,
countries providing these data generally project broad stability or
marginal declines in expenditures, possibly reﬂecting program re-
forms already undertaken and declining unemployment. Signiﬁcant
increases over the full ﬁfty-year period are projected only by Norway.
• Public health care and long-term care spending averaged around 6
percent of GDP in 2000 (Panel D), although some differences in
coverage mean that these results may not be rigorously compara-
ble across countries. The average increase over the 2000–50 period
for the fourteen countries where this information is available is 3
to 3.5 percentage points of GDP. But for ﬁve countries, including
the United States, increases of 4 percentage points or more are
projected. Slow aging is partly responsible for the smaller increases
in spending in Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
• Reductions in child-related spending are projected to offset increases
elsewhere to the extent of around 1 percentage point of GDP on
average over the projection period (Panel E). The United States is
around average in this regard. There is no certainty that all of these
potential economies will be reaped. In practice, it has been difﬁcult
to make cuts in these areas and further pressures may well arise
from longer periods of education for the young, increased training
7 Projected effects of reforms in a few countries (for example, Italy and Sweden)
contribute to this result.
8 Excluding early retirement provisions within old-age pension systems themselves.
This item covers programs permitting early withdrawal from the labor market, for example
through disability programs.
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Age-Related Spending






















Australia 16.7 5.6 5.6 3.0 1.6 1.6
Austria
f 10.4 4.6 2.3 9.5 4.3 2.2
Belgium 22.1 5.4 5.2 8.8 3.7 3.3
Canada 17.9 8.7 8.7 5.1 5.8 5.8
Czech Republic 23.1 6.9 6.9 7.8 6.8 6.8
Denmark
g 29.3 7.3 5.7 6.1 3.6 2.7
Finland 19.4 8.5 8.5 8.1 4.8 4.8
France
h —— — 12.1 4.0 3.9
Germany —— — 11.8 5.0 5.0
Hungary
i 7.1 1.6 1.6 6.0 1.2 1.2
Italy —— — 14.2 1.7 0.3
Japan 13.7 3.0 3.0 7.9 1.0 0.6
Korea 3.1 8.5 8.5 2.1 8.0 8.0
Netherlands
j 19.1 10.1 9.9 5.2 5.3 4.8
New Zealand 18.7 8.4 8.4 4.8 5.7 5.7
Norway 17.9 13.7 13.4 4.9 8.2 8.0
Poland
i 12.2 2.6 2.6 10.8 2.5 2.5
Spain —— — 9.4 8.0 8.0
Sweden 29.0 3.4 3.2 9.2 2.2 1.6
United Kingdom 15.6 .8 .2 4.3 .0 .7
United States 11.2 5.5 5.5 4.4 1.8 1.8
Average of
countries above
e 16.9 5.9 5.5 7.4 3.8 3.4
Average of countries
which provide all or
nearly all spending
components 18.7 7.2 6.9
Portugal
l 15.6 6.6 4.3 8.0 4.5 4.5
a The peak values are in 2050 except for Denmark (2030), Sweden, and the United Kingdom (2035), and
Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, and Korea (2040).
b The peak values are in 2050 except for Japan (2015), the United Kingdom and Italy (2030), the United States,
Sweden, Austria, Denmark, and France (2035), and the Netherlands, Norway, and Belgium (2040).
c The peak values are in 2050 except for Belgium and Denmark (2025), Finland (2010), the Netherlands (2020),
Poland (2035), and Sweden (2005). For Czech Republic the highest level is in 2000.
d The peak values are in 2050 except for Denmark and Korea (2035), Norway, and the United Kingdom (2040).
e 0.0 indicates the highest level is in 2000. The peak values are in 2035 for Denmark and in 2040 for Norway
and the Netherlands.
f Total pension spending includes other age-related spending which does not fall within the definition in Panels
B to E. This represents 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2000 and rises by 0.1 percentage point in the period to 2050.
232 Paul AtkinsonTable 2 (continued)
Age-Related Spending


































.9 .2 .2 6.8 6.2 6.2 6.1 .0 2.3
—— — —— — —— —
1.1 .1 .1 6.2 3.0 3.0 6.0 .0 1.3
—— —6.3 4.2 4.2 6.4 .0 1.3
1.8 .7 .7 7.5 2.0 2.0 6.0 — 1.2
4.0 .8 .2 6.6 2.7 2.7 6.3 .3 .0
3.1 .1 .1 8.1 3.8 3.8 —— —
—— — —— — —— —
—— — —— — —— —
1.2 .3 .3 —— — —— —
—— — —— — —— —
—— —5.8 2.4 2.4 —— —
.3 .0 .0 .7 .8 .5 —— —
1.2 .4 .4 7.2 4.8 4.8 5.4 .1 .0
—— —6.7 4.0 4.0 7.2 .0 1.3
2.4 1.6 1.6 5.2 3.5 3.2 5.5 .5 .5
1.4 .2 .1 —— — —— —
—— — —— — —— —
1.9 .2 .4 8.1 3.2 3.2 9.8 .0 1.2
—— —5.6 1.8 1.7 5.7 .0 .9
.2 .3 .3 2.6 4.4 4.4 3.9 .0 1.0
1.6 .3 .2 6.0 3.3 3.3 6.2 — .9
2.5 .4 .4 — — — — —
g Totalincludesotherage-relatedspendingthatcannotbeclassifiedundertheotherheadings.Thisrepresents
6.3 percent of GDP in 2000 and increases by 0.2 percentage points from 2000 to 2050.
h For France, the latest available year is 2040.
i Total includes old-age pension spending and “early retirement” programs only.
j “Early retirement” programs only include spending on persons 55.
k OECD average excludes countries where information is not available and Portugal, which is less comparable,
than other countries.
l Portugal provided an estimate for total age-related spending but did not provide expenditure for all of the
spending components.
Source: OECD.
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care as the share of women working increases.
Finally, there is an important caveat about these projections for many
countries that echoes Lee and Edwards’ warning that difﬁcult decisions
will be needed. To illustrate the forces driving the change in pension
spending, Table 3 breaks it into four factors:
9
• A dependency or population-aging effect, reﬂecting changes in the
ratio of those aged 55 and over to the population aged 20 to 64.
10
• An employment effect, driven by changes in the ratio of the
population aged 20 to 64 to employment.
• The beneﬁt effect, related to changes in the average pension beneﬁt
relative to GDP per worker.
• An eligibility effect, corresponding to changes in the share of those
receiving beneﬁts in the 55 and over age group.
11
The results show the increase in spending associated with the change in
each one of these components taken independently. The last two factors
are measures of the changing generosity of pension systems.
Those results need to be treated with caution and are discussed at
some length in the OECD Economic Outlook chapter. It sufﬁces to note here
that in a number of countries the projected spending numbers fail to give
a good picture of the underlying pressures that will build up because the
“difﬁcult decisions” to which Lee and Edwards refer are built into the
calculations. That is, they are assumed to take place notwithstanding the
political issues they will raise. In particular, as noted in footnote b of Table
3, relative declines in beneﬁts are particularly marked in a few countries.
Italy will shift to a system where beneﬁts are contribution-based, indexed




POP 55  
POP 20  64








POP 55  
, where
PENS/GDP is the ratio of old-age pension spending to GDP, POP(55) is the population
55 and over, POP(20-64) is the population 20 to 64, EMPL is employment, AVBEN is total
old-age pension spending divided by the number of recipients, AVPDTY is labor produc-
tivity, and REC is the number of recipients. The change in spending associated with each
component is roughly equal to the ratio of old-age pensions to GDP in 2000 multiplied by
the growth rate of the component over the period. For further information see Dang et al.
(2001).
10 This takes into account the fact that a considerable number of older workers retire
before age 65.
11 For France, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, it was necessary to assume that
the number of beneﬁciaries equaled the non-active share of the population aged 55 and
older. This approximation for the eligibility ratio leads to an overestimation of the number
of beneﬁciaries. Correspondingly, with average beneﬁts deﬁned as total pension expendi-
ture in any year divided by the number of beneﬁciaries, this procedure leads to an
underestimate of the average beneﬁt (calculated as the residual) for these countries.
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This is projected to lead to a reduction in average beneﬁts equivalent to
5 to 6 percentage points of GDP. Similar reforms in Sweden are also
expected to lead to substantial declines in average beneﬁts. The sharp fall
Table 3
Decomposition of Changes in Old-age Pension Spending: 2000–2050
a
(Level in per cent of GDP, changes in percentage points)
Total Old-age















Australia 3.0 1.6 2.5 .1 .5 .2
Austria 9.5 2.2 7.6 1.9 1.1 2.4
Belgium 8.8 3.3 4.7 .7 1.6 1.0
Canada 5.1 5.8 5.1 .0 .6 1.3
Czech Republic 7.8 6.8 8.2 .8 .1 .1
Denmark 6.1 2.7 2.7 .3 1.5 1.7
Finland 8.1 4.8 5.2 .1 .2 .0
France
c 12.1 3.8 7.6 .5 3.4 .4
Germany 11.8 5.0 6.4 .7 2.7 2.1
Hungary 6.0 1.2 2.9 1.0 .3 .4
Italy
d 14.2 .3 10.1 3.2 5.5 1.5
Japan
d 7.9 .6 5.1 1.2 3.9 .9
Korea 2.1 8.0 4.8 1.0 .2 5.0
Netherlands 5.2 4.8 3.8 .5 .2 1.4
New Zealand 4.8 5.7 4.7 .1 1.0 .0
Norway 4.9 8.0 3.0 .1 3.9 1.2
Poland 10.8 2.5 7.3 1.3 5.9 2.1
Spain 9.4 8.0 8.6 2.6 .0 2.0
Sweden
d 9.2 1.6 3.9 .5 2.1 .4
United Kingdom
d 4.3 .7 1.7 .1 2.5 .1




e 7.4 3.4 5.2 .8 1.3 .5
Portugal 8.0 4.5 6.1 1.0 2.7 1.1
a See Dang et al. (2001) for methodology and detailed information on the time profile. Columns do not add up
because linear approximations are used.
b The associated percent declines in average benefits relative to average productivity over the period 2000 to
2050 are particularly important in the following countries: Belgium (16), Denmark (11), France (21),
Germany (20), Italy (30), Japan (38), Poland (51), Sweden (22), and the United Kingdom (47) per-
cent. All other countries are under 10 percent except Norway, where the average benefit is projected to rise by
53.6 percent.
c For France, data are available for 2040.
d For these countries information on the number of pension recipients and average pensions was not available.
These variables were estimated by the OECD Secretariat except for Italy, where data refer to the number of
pensions and not the number of pensioners.
e Average excludes countries where national information is not available and Portugal, for which data are not
comparable to those for other countries.
Source: OECD.
THE FISCAL IMPACT OF POPULATION CHANGE: DISCUSSION 235for Japan reﬂects legislation that requires beneﬁts to be adjusted every
ﬁve years to bring the pension system into balance. For France, the shift
to indexing on prices and the lengthening of contribution periods and of
the reference period for calculating pensions will progressively affect
spending. Declines in pension beneﬁts in Poland and the relatively
modest increases in Hungary reﬂect shifts to a private system. In the
United Kingdom, the overall fall in pension spending reﬂects the as-
sumed constancy in real terms of the ﬂat-rate basic pension. These
changes are sufﬁciently large as to require a build-up in private pension
saving if income adequacy in retirement is to be maintained for all.
Failing this, lower incomes and increased poverty among the elderly raise
the risk of political pressure for a reversal of these policies, particularly as
the elderly will make up a growing share of the electorate. This under-
lines the need for creating conditions that encourage private savings for
retirement.
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